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I. Introduction and Summary of Conclusions
A. Introduction
This memorandum addresses issues related to Belgium’s exercise of universal
jurisdiction over targets of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).1 This
memorandum addresses the issues that arise from a conflict between ICTR and Belgian domestic
jurisdiction. It describes the theory of universal jurisdiction and how it is implemented in
Belgium, by statute, investigations and cases. The history of the Belgian presence in Rwanda is
also discussed.
The memorandum then examines the statute of the ICTR along side with the Belgian
statute codifying universal jurisdiction. It then discusses the issues of primacy and deferral,
double jeopardy and conflict of laws that arise from Belgium’s exercise of universal jurisdiction.
It gives examples of cases of possible concurrent jurisdiction between the ICTR and Belgium.
These cases also examine the issues of primacy of the ICTR and deferral by national courts.
Finally, the memorandum addresses the Belgian exercise of universal jurisdiction over
Rwandans involved in the genocide and the impact of that case on the further exercise of
universal jurisdiction.

B. Summary of Conclusions
i. Legally, the ICTR has primacy over national courts.
Under the ICTR Statute, Article 8(2), the ICTR shall have primacy over all national
courts and may, at any stage of the procedure, request the national court to defer to the ICTR’s

1

E-mail from Andra Mobberly, Prosecution Counsel, received 31 August 2001. [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 43.]

1

competence.2 As the ICTR was established under the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council’s
Chapter VII powers, all States are bound by the ICTR Statute.3 Article 8(2) of the Statute grants
the ICTR ultimate primacy, while Article 28 demands cooperation with the Tribunal.4
Therefore, under the ICTR Statute and the duties imposed upon States by the U.N. Security
Council Chapter VII powers, the ICTR would have primacy over any target within the national
courts of Belgium.

ii. The ICTR must consistently and appropriately apply its primacy over
Belgium to avoid possible conflicts with that State.

The cases involving the exercise of primacy by the ICTR over national courts has
established a precedent by which national courts must defer to the competency of the Tribunal.
In light of the Belgian exercise of universal jurisdiction over ICTR targets, the Tribunal must
maintain the same level of assertions of primacy over leader or figure-head targets it wishes to
prosecute. If primacy is not exerted and Belgium does prosecute these leaders or figure-heads,
they will, in most instances, not be legally retried in the ICTR.5 The national courts are needed
to cooperate in the prosecution of persons involved in the genocide, but the Tribunal is needed to

2

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter “ICTR Statute”),
reprinted in 2 VIRGINA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]
3

S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 44.] See also MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 22, at 313.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17.]
4

ICTR Statute Article 8(2), 28. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]

5

ICTR Statute Article 9 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]

2

prosecute the lead offenders, as a deterrent and reconciler.6 Thus, the consistent and appropriate
application of primacy by the ICTR over targets in national courts will serve to maintain the
legitimacy of both the ICTR and its statutorily granted exercise of primacy.

II. Factual Background
A. History of Universal Jurisdiction
Universal jurisdiction is defined as the exercise of jurisdiction of any state over certain
offenses of universal concern, regardless of where or by whom the offense was committed.7
Persons committing these offenses, so heinous as to offend all of humanity, are considered hostis
humani generis or the enemy of all humanity.8 Piracy is considered the first crime to be subject
to universal jurisdiction, as pirates committed acts of violence without regard for nationality
while moving throughout the high seas and out of the reach of the territorial jurisdiction of the

6

See Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal
Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415, 486 (2001). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 22.]
7

See Michael P. Scharf, The ICC’s Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A
Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 WTR LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 76 (2001). [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 30.] See also generally, Kenneth C. Randall, Universal
Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785 (1988). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 26.]
8

See Leila Nadya Sadat, Symposium: Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects:
Redefining Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 241, 244 (2001). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 29.] See also Michael P. Scharf, Symposium: Universal
Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities and Prospects: Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction
to Nationals of Non-Party States, 35 NEW ENG. L REV. 363, 370 (2001). “Crimes subject to the
universality principle are so threatening to the international community or so heinous in scope
and degree that they offend the interest of all humanity, and any state may, as humanity’s agent,
punish the offender.” [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]

3

victim states.9 Three hundred years later, the atrocities of World War II brought about the
exercise of universal jurisdiction by the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals as well as the domestic
courts of states.10 While no positive rule of international law exists for foreign states to punish
foreign nationals for crimes against humanity, there has been a growing recognition that the law
of mankind has supremacy over the law of the sovereign state.11
In the aftermath of World War II, the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly,
“unanimously affirmed the ‘principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and the Judgment of the Tribunal,’ thereby ‘codifying the jurisdictional
right of all [s]tates to prosecute the offenses addressed by the IMT [Nuremberg Tribunal],’
namely war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression.”12 The U.N. General
Assembly adopted the Principles of International Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest,

9

See Scharf, supra note 7, at 81. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 30.]

10

See id. at 82. “Trials exercising [universal jurisdiction] took place in international tribunals at
Nuremberg and Tokyo, as well as domestic courts. Some individuals faced trial in the states in
which they had committed their crimes, but others were tried by whatever state in which they
were later captured, surrendered, or found – including such far-off countries as Canada and
Australia.” [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 30.]

11

M. Cherif Bassiouni, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 524525 (1992). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12.] See also Mark S. Zaid,
Symposium: Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects: Will or Should the United
States Ever Prosecute War Criminals?: A need for Greater Expansion in the Areas of Both
Criminal and Civil Liability, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 447, 458 (2001). “However, during the last
decade a growing number of States have enacted legislation specifically permitting the
prosecution of future war crimes. These actions demonstrate the trend toward ensuring that
perpetrators of war crimes do not go unpunished, regardless of where the underlying act may
have taken place or to whom it occurred.” [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
34.]
12

See Scharf, supra note 7, at 83. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 30.]
Belgium joined the United Nations on 27 December 1945.
www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html

4

Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in
Resolution 3074, 3 December 1973.13 In it, the U.N. declared that states are obligated to bring to
justice those persons responsible for grave violations of international law.14 The four Geneva
Conventions also require all state parties to prosecute or extradite persons violating the
provisions of the Geneva Conventions, thus imposing a duty on domestic courts to exercise
universal jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.15
Since crimes against humanity, including genocide, and war crimes can be considered
customary law, each state has the ability to prosecute individuals for these offenses under
universal jurisdiction. These crimes are recognized as violations of both national and
international law, or crimes ex jure gentium.16 Under the 1948 Genocide Convention, in fact,
states are obligated to institute domestic legislation to criminalize genocide and enact appropriate
punishments.17
The United Nations, since World War II, has continually affirmed the ability of states to
prosecute war criminals as the state has jurisdiction to punish offenses against the whole of

13

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 30.]

14

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: 14 PRINCIPLES ON THE EFFECTIVE
EXERCISE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 13 (1999). http://www.amnesty.org [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 45.]
15

See id. at 1-2. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 45.]

16

See Theodor Meron, Article, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 A.J.I.L.
554, 567 (1995). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23.]
17

Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Symposium on Method in International Law:
Policy-Oriented Jurispurdence and Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World
Public Order of Human Dignity, 93 A.J.I.L. 316, 328-329 (1999). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 33.]

5

nations.18 The crimes over which the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda “shocked the conscience of the International Community because of
their gravity, scale, and effects on international peace.”19 The U.N. Security Council Resolution
955 creating the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) requires states to
cooperate fully with the International Tribunal and its organs in accordance with
the present resolution and the Statute of the International Tribunal and that
consequently all States shall take any measures necessary under their domestic
law to implement the provisions of the present resolution and the Statute,
including the obligation of States to comply with request for assistance or orders
issued by a Trial Chamber under Article 28 of the Statute[.]20
The Security Council Resolution instructs states to “take any measures necessary under their
domestic law” to execute the Resolution and the ICTR Statute.21 This includes the codification
of universal jurisdiction to have the ability and jurisdiction to prosecute persons involved in the
genocide.

B. History of the Belgian Presence in Rwanda
After World War I and the defeat of Germany, Belgium assumed the role of colonial
power in Rwanda.22 In 1933, Belgium conducted a census distinguishing the Tutsi and Hutu

18

See Zaid, supra note 11, at 450-451. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 34.]

19

Danner, supra note 6, at 849. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22.]

20

S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 44.]
21

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 44.]

22

See 1 VIRGINA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA 49 (1998). (After Germany’s defeat in World War I, many European nations rushed to
colonize former German colonies. In Rwanda, the Germans had instituted a system of control
with the minority Tutsi’s as puppet leaders and the majority Hutu population as second class
6

populations and distributed identification cards to maintain a system of apartheid with minority
Tutsis in control.23 The Belgians, and the Germans before them, believed the minority Tutsis to
be more European with their “lighter skin, thinner lips, and straighter noses” than Hutu
features.24 More than twenty years later, in 1956, Belgium organized elections at the instruction
of the United Nations Trusteeship Council.25 The elections of members of local organs were
based on universal suffrage and, inevitably, the voting went with party, or ethnic, lines.26 With
this universal suffrage, the Hutu “obtained an overwhelming majority and thereby became aware
of their political strength.”27 In 1959, a Hutu-lead revolt against the Tutsi government
succeeded and Belgium decolonized Rwanda and granted its independence.28 This Hutu-led
revolt was followed by a cycle of mass killings of Tutsis, the exodus of surviving Tutsis,
invasions of the territory of Rwanda by exiled Tutsis, and reprisal killings in Rwanda after these
unsuccessful invasions by the Tutsis.29

citizens. When Belgium colonized Rwanda, it maintained this system of control). [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17.]
23

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17.]

24

Evo Popoff, Note, Inconsistency and Impunity in International Rights Law: Can the
International Criminal Court Solve the Problems Raised by the Rwanda and Augusto Pinochet
Cases, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 363, 369 (2001). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 25.]
25

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (2 September 1998). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 4.]
26

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4.]

27

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4.]

28

See id. at 370. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4.]

29

MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 1, at 50. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
17.]
7

At the start of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Belgian Peacekeeping troops were present
in Rwanda, protecting then-Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana.30 Both the Prime Minister
and ten Belgian Peacekeepers were killed, prompting the withdrawal of the Belgian forces in
Rwanda.31 At the same time, the genocide in Rwanda continued at an alarming rate.
In light of Belgium’s history as a colonial power in Rwanda, their exercise of universal
jurisdiction could be interpreted as just another form of that colonialism, thus taking credibility
away from the decisions of Belgian courts.32 In turn, that lack of credibility could affect the
credibility of the Tribunal itself, since the ICTR Statute specifically included the concurrent
jurisdiction of national courts to work in cooperation with the Tribunal.33

30

See id. at 54. Belgium wished to prosecute Bernard Ntuyahaga for the deaths of the ten
Belgian Peacekeepers. See infra at __. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17.]

31

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17.] See also Popoff, supra note
24, at 378 (discussing a general lack of intervention in the Rwanda genocide by the international
community, including Belgium’s withdrawal of its troops on 15 April 1994, nine days after the
start of the genocide). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25.]
32

INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HARD CASES: BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATORS TO JUSTICE ABROAD 21 (1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
15.]
33

See Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga, ICTR-98-40-T, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion to
Withdraw the Indictment (18 March 1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
10.]
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C. History of the Belgian Use of Universal Jurisdiction
i. Rationale and Legislative History of “Loi relative a la repression de violation
graves de droit international humanitaire” or Act Concerning the
Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law
In 1993, Belgium passed a statute codifying the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocols to maintain jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity.34 It appears that Belgium is one state that has fully adopted the responsibilities
of the Geneva Conventions.35 Since the crimes enumerated in the Geneva Conventions are
considered customary law, or jus cogens, Belgium’s codification of universal jurisdiction
supports this norm of jus cogens and the obligations, erga omnes, that arise from it.36 Belgium

34

Luc Reydams, International Decision: Belgian Tribunal of First Instance in Brussels
(investigating magistrate), November 8, 1998, 93 A.J.I.L. 700 (1999). The 1993 law was later
amended and retitled “Loi relative a la repression des violation graves de droit international
humanitaire.” The law was also clarified to apply to crimes committed before the adoption of
the statute, as crimes against humanity and the Geneva Conventions are considered customary
international law. See id. at fn. 7. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 27.] See
also Act Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law,
reprinted in English at 38 I.L.M. 918 (1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
2.]
35

Mark Zaid, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects: Will or Should the United
States Ever Prosecute War Criminals?: A Need for Greater Expansion in the Areas of Both
Criminal and Civil Liability, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 447, 462 (2001). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 34.]
36

See id. at 405. The obligations, for example, include prosecute or extradite or the general
maintenance of international justice. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 34.]

9

has moved past the international standard of obeying humanitarian law to enforcing that law as it
applies to all persons, Belgian or not.37
The legislative history of this law indicates a fear that Belgium would become a refuge
for perpetrators of the genocide in Rwanda.38 Therefore, it became important to codify universal
jurisdiction to positively deal with cases involving non-nationals of Belgium.39
The Act had a dual purpose of punishment and prevention; Belgian legislators believed
that the criminalization of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity would have a
greater deterrent effect and would expand the preventative force against these crimes.40 The act
also explicitly excluded a difference between internal and international armed conflict, noting the
number of human rights violations that do not occur in international conflicts, but rather in
internal conflicts.41 This Act codifies the principle of universal jurisdiction for use by Belgium,
regardless of where, to whom, or by whom the atrocities occurred.42
If the goal, however, of universal jurisdiction is to maintain justice and fundamental
principles of the international community, one nation endowing itself with this task could lead to
37

Ruth Wedgwood, National Courts and the Prosecution of War Crimes, in SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 405, (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald &
Olivia Swaak-Goldman eds., 2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 15.]
38

See Act Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law,
reprinted in English at 38 I.L.M. 918, fn. 14 (1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 2.] See also Fiona McKay, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN EUROPE,
http://www.redress.org/unijeur/html. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 46.]
39

See Act Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law,
reprinted in English at 38 I.L.M. 918, fn. 14 (1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 2.]

40

See id. at 918. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]

41

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]

42

See Meron, supra note 16, at 577. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23.]
10

“jurisdictional imperialism.”43 Each individual state may become “de facto agents” over
international crime, prosecuting certain persons in reflection of political, rather than legal,
considerations.44 In fact, Belgium is earning an embarrassing reputation from its multiple
investigations into alleged human rights violations by world leaders.45 Therefore, Belgium’s
exercise of universal jurisdiction could color the government as “jurisdictional imperialists,” thus
taking away credibility of the national courts and the Tribunal. Because there is a possible risk
of prosecutions being politically motivated or possibly initiated under bias,46 the ICTR must be
careful to monitor these investigations in national courts if the concurrent jurisdiction enunciated

43

Bruce Broomhall, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects: Toward the
Development of an Effective System of Universal Jurisdiction for Crimes Under International
Law, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 399, 416. See id. at 403. Bruce Broomhall is the Senior Coordinator
for the International Justice Program, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and is a Ph.D.
Candidate at King’s College, London. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20.]
See also INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HARD CASES: BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATORS TO JUSTICE ABROAD (1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 15.]
44

See id. at 403. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20.] See also Meron, supra
note 16, at 571. “Some governments will protest foreign prosecutions based on activities that
may reflect their state policy, And probably, legal advisers of many foreign ministries will
discourage the justice departments of their countries from prosecuting foreign officers for their
conduct during a civil war in their own country.” [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 23.]

45

See Cubans Use Belgian Law to File Case Against Castro, N.Y. TIMES, 4 October 2001, at 28.
The case against Ariel Sharon, discussed infra at __, “has embarrassed the Belgian government,
which currently hold the rotating EU presidency, and caused Sharon to shun visiting European
Union headquarters in Brussels.” Id. Regarding the charges against Fidel Castro, discussed infra
at __, Belgium responded “’We hope and trust this will not affect the good relations between
Belgium and Cuba,’ Foreign Ministry spokesman Koen Vervaeke told Reuters.” Id. [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 35.]
46

Madeleine H. Morris, Symposium: Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects:
Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference Remarks, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 337,
338 (2001). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 24.]
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in the ICTR Statute Article 8(1?) will continue to function as a supplement to the jurisdiction of
the ICTR.

ii. Belgian Cases Employing the Act Concerning the Punishment of Grave
Breaches of International Humanitarian Law
Belgium has employed this law of universal jurisdiction in a number of cases. In March
of 2000, an investigating magistrate began investigating former Iranian president Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani for torture and unlawful detention of a Teheran-born Belgian citizen.47 No
extradition request has been made for President Rafsanjani, but Belgium has instituted
proceedings against other world leaders.48
Abdoulaye Yerodia, acting foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo, was
indicted for grave violations of international humanitarian law by the same Belgian investigating
magistrate.49 Yerodia had instigated violence against Tutsis in Kinshasa by broadcasting on the
radio for “eradication and the crushing of the Rwandan... invaders” describing them as “vermin”

47

Ruth Wedgwood, International Conference: Augusto Pinochet and International Law, 46
MCGILL L. J. 241, 250 (2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32.]
48

See id. Belgium has been asked to investigate world leaders such as Augusto Pinochet, Ariel
Sharon, Yasser Arafat, and Fidel Castro. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32.]
See infra at __.
49

See id. at 251. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32.]
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and “cockroaches.”50 In this case, Belgium issued an arrest warrant and sent it to the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and also sent copies to other countries.51
While the above cases related to a Belgian citizen and events related to the Rwandan
genocide, Belgium has also exercised its universal jurisdiction over world leaders. In 1998,
Chilean exiles living in Belgium filed a criminal complaint against former Chilean dictator
Augusto Pinochet, charging him with crimes under international law.52 Pinochet argued head-ofstate immunity, legality and double-criminality requirement, to which the investigating
magistrate did not find that Belgium’s exercise of universal jurisdiction violated any of these
doctrines.53
More recently, complaints against Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon were submitted to
the Belgian courts on behalf of twenty-three Palestinian survivors of a 1982 massacre in
Lebanon.54 A Belgian magistrate agreed to open the investigation into Sharon after ruling that
two complaints may warrant prosecution.55 A hearing regarding Belgium’s exercise of
jurisdiction has been postponed until November 2001.56

50

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32.]

51

See id. The implications of these “international warrants” is that world leaders will be unable
to travel outside their own country and/or that other states will not recognize their validity.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32.]
52

Reydams, supra note 34, at 700. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 27.]

53

See id. at 700-701. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 27.] See also
generally Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Symposium: Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and
Prospects: The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 311
(2001). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 28.]
54

Constant Brand, Sharon Lawyers to Study Belgium’s Jurisdiction, CHI. TRI., 4 October 2001,
at 12. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 36.]
55

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 36.]
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The Terror Victims’ Association, a group of Israeli victims of Palestinian attacks, have
filed a complaint against Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat.57 The complaint addresses Arafat’s
command responsibility and encouragement of “incitement against the Israeli people.”58 The
Terror Victims’ Association, a group formed fourteen years ago, noted that this legal action was
the first concerted attempt to bring Arafat to justice in front of a court.59
Criminal charges against Cuban dictator Fidel Castro were also submitted to the Belgian
court on behalf of Cuban exiles living in the United States.60 The complaint alleged false
imprisonment, torture and murder as violations of crimes against humanity.61 An investigating
magistrate will decide whether Belgium has jurisdiction over the case and whether the case is
admissible under Belgian law.62

56

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 36.]

57

Philip Jacobson, Israeli Victims Sue Arafat Under Belgian War Crime Law, THE SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH (London), 23 September 2001, at 28. The article also mentioned the investigation
of charges brought under Belgian law against Saddam Hussein. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 39.]
58

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 39.]

59

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 39.]

60

Cubans Use Belgian Law to File Case Against Castro, N.Y. TIMES, 4 October 2001, at 28.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 35.]
61

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 35.]

62

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 35.]
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III. Legal Discussion
A. Statutory Considerations
i. ICTR Statute: Codification of Concurrent Jurisdiction and Primacy
The ICTR Statute states:
The International Tribunal for Rwanda and national courts shall have concurrent
jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens for
such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, beginning on 1
January 1994 and ending on 31 December 1994.63

The Statute also states “The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have primacy over the
national courts of all States.”64 While the ICTR Statute confers jurisdiction to national courts, it
maintains supremacy over those national courts and can, “at any stage in the procedure,” request
a national court to defer jurisdiction to the ICTR.65
The primacy of the Tribunal functions to resolve any dispute between the national courts
and the Tribunal.66 Primacy also functions to deter state parties from initiating “sham
proceedings absolving their own nationals”67 while at the same time, promoting fair trials where
fair trials are not possible; “belligerents who will not give a fair trial to their adversaries in the
midst or immediate aftermath of the conflict.”68

63

ICTR Statute, Article 8(2). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]

64

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]

65

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]

66

MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 22, at 313. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
17.]

67

See Wedgwood, supra note 47, at 394. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32.]

68

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32.]
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The Tribunal itself ruled on the issue of primacy in The Prosecutor v. Bernard
Ntuyahaga. It stated,
WHEREAS the Chamber, although it accepts the submissions of the Prosecutor and the
Belgian Government inasmuch as the Tribunal does not have exclusive jurisdiction over
crimes included in its mandate and that its criminal proceedings are complementary to
those of national jurisdictions, it wishes to underscore that, in its opinion, and as
submitted by the Defence, the principle of concurrent jurisdiction as provided in
paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the Statute, which recognizes the complementary nature of the
judicial work performed by the Tribunal and national courts, must be read together with
the provisions of paragraph 2 of said Article 8, which confers upon the Tribunal primacy
over the national courts of all states.69

Simply put, the Tribunal enjoys primacy over all national courts, regardless of concurrent cases
arising under national courts’ jurisdictions. National courts, like Belgium’s, can exercise
jurisdiction over ICTR targets.70 The Tribunal, however, maintains the ability to exercise
primacy over these targets and the national courts must comply.71
Since the ICTR was created through the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers, all
nations bound by the U.N. Charter are likewise bound by the provisions of the ICTR Statute.
Therefore, Belgium would be bound by the ICTR Statute, and any request for deferment to the
Tribunal should be granted. Also, as Security Council Resolution 955 requires “all States shall
cooperate fully with the International Tribunal... and the Statute of the International Tribunal,”72

69

Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga, ICTR-98-40-T, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion to Withdraw
the Indictment (18 March 1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]

70

ICTR Statute, Article 8(1). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]

71

ICTR Statute, Article 8(2). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.] See also
Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga, ICTR-98-40-T, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion to Withdraw the
Indictment (18 March 1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]

72

S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 44.]
16

Belgium is bound by the Resolution to comply with any assertion of primacy by the ICTR over
the national courts of Belgium.

ii. The Belgian Statute: Codification of Universal Jurisdiction
Chapter II, Article 7 of Belgium’s law codifying universal jurisdiction, Act Concerning
the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, states “The Belgian
Courts shall be competent to deal with breaches provided for in the present Act, irrespective of
where such breaches have been committed.”73 These breaches include:

•

the crime of genocide as defined under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948;74

•

crimes against humanity as defined in the Statute of the International Criminal Court or
Rome Statute;75

•

crimes caused by acts or omissions against protected persons as defined by the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocols I and II;76

•

crimes facilitating any breaches of the above mentioned crimes.77

73

Act Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law,
reprinted in English at 38 I.L.M. 918, 924 (1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 2.]
74

See id. at 921. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]

75

See id. at 921-922. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]

76

See id. at 922-924. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]

77

See id. at 924. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]
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The universal jurisdiction codified by this law is based upon the Geneva Conventions and the
Additional Protocols I and II, in accordance with “the principle of aut dedere aut judicare,
obliging the High Contracting Parties to extradite or to prosecute the offenders of grave
breaches.”78 The Belgian statute grants jurisdiction over non-nationals for grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions, yet it does not require the prosecution of the violations.79 Thus, Belgium is
under no statutory obligation to prosecute each and every person who violates the Geneva
Conventions and their Protocols, but has the legal ability to do so.
The effect of this codification of universal jurisdiction is to give a statutory basis for the
jurisdiction of Belgian national courts to prosecute persons involved in the genocide in Rwanda
and also any other persons committing crimes against humanity.80 It also satisfies any question
regarding legality and customary international law, as the Act is the codification of customary
international law.81

78

Act Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law,
reprinted in English at 38 I.L.M. 918, fn. 14 (1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 2.]
79

80

See id. at 924. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]
See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]

81

See Danner, supra note 6, at 432-433. (discussing the ICTY and ICTR use of only firmly
established customary international law). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
22.]
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B. Legal Considerations of Belgium’s Use of Universal Jurisdiction
i. Primacy of the Tribunal and Deferral by National Courts
Primacy is used to “ensure minimum standards of justice and impartial adjudications will
be met in cases of great international concern.”82 In the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) case against Dusko Tadic, a request for deferral was made by the
Tribunal to the government of Germany in an exercise of primacy.83 The Prosecutor, Richard
Goldstone, “argued that the Tribunal was the ‘only proper forum for trying those accused of
playing leading roles in’ the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina.”84 Tadic argued that the
primacy of the ICTY violated domestic courts jurisdiction and the sovereignty of the state of
Germany.85 The Appeals Chamber rejected this argument and “asserted that primacy was a
functional necessity for an international criminal tribunal.”86
The Appeals Chamber went on to strongly endorse their primacy over all domestic
courts:
Indeed, when an international tribunal such as the present one is created, it
must be endowed with primacy over national courts. Otherwise, human nature
being what it is, there would be a perennial danger of international crimes being
characterized as “ordinary crimes”…
If not effectively countered by the principle of primacy, any one of those
stratagems might be used to defeat the very purpose of the creation of an

82

Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National
Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE INT’L L. 383, 398 (1998). [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]
83

See id. at 403-404. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]

84

Id. at 403. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]

85

See id. at 404. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]

86

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]
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international criminal jurisdiction, to the benefit of the very people whom it has
been designed to prosecute.
The principle of primacy of this International Tribunal over national
courts must be affirmed; the more so since it is confined within the strict limits of
Articles 9 and 10 of the Statute and Rules 9 and 10 of the Rules of Procedure of
the International Tribunal [which are almost identical to the ICTR statute].87

While the language of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes are similar, the ICTR has stronger
language regarding primacy.88 Therefore, the same “strict limits” of the ICTR Statute should be
followed.89 The ICTR has consistently affirmed this stance on Primacy in its own decisions.90
Both the ICTY and the ICTR have successfully employed primacy over national courts and
should continue to do so.91

87

Id. (emphasis added) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]

88

See Brown, supra note 82, at 402. “The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR STatute) is quite similar to that of the ICTY, but there is a key difference in its
primacy clause. The ICTR Statute accords it ‘primacy over national courts of all States,’
language that is stronger than the more ambiguously worded grant of ‘primacy over national
courts’ in the ICTY Statute.” [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]

89

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]

90

Discussed infra at __.

91

Discussed infra at __. See also Brown, supra note 82, at 407. “[T]he primacy of the ad hoc
tribunals retains the mandatory legal force it was granted in the Statute despite the efforts of a
few Security Council members to limit its scope. This conclusion is supported by the text of the
ICTY and ICTR Statutes; by the practice of the ICTY’s Judges and prosecutors, who have
reaffirmed the general primacy of the International Tribunal at every turn; and even by the recent
practice of the Security Council itself in approving the Statute of the Rwanda Tribunal.”
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]
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ii. Non Bis In Idem (Double Jeopardy) Situations Can Be Avoided Through the
Use of Primacy Over National Courts
The ICTR Statute states “No person shall be tried before a national court for acts
constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law under the present Statute, for
which he or she has already been tried by the International Tribunal for Rwanda.”92 In the
alternative, the ICTR Statute allows persons tried by national courts to subsequently be tried in
the ICTR only if the prior act charged was an ordinary crime or the national court proceedings
were sham proceedings or not impartial.93 Therefore, the Tribunal can only retry persons who
were merely charged with an “ordinary crime” or who were involved in sham proceedings in the
national courts. This could narrow the field of possible indictments if Belgium and other
countries continue to prosecute ICTR targets. However, as the primacy clause of the ICTR
Statute tells us, the Tribunal may exercise its jurisdiction over those targets it wishes to that are
being tried in national courts.94
The ICTY has also addressed the issue of non bis in idem in the Tadic case. Tadic
challenged the primacy of the ICTY by alleging that he was being retried by the ICTY.95 The
ICTY declined from linking primacy and non bis in idem, and instead ruled on non bis in idem

92

ICTR Statute, Article 9(1). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]

93

ICTR Statute, Article 9(2)(a) & (b). “A person who has been tried by a national court for acts
constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law may be subsequently tried by
the International Tribunal for Rwanda only if:
(a) The act for which he or she was tried was characterized as an ordinary crime; or
(b) The national court proceedings were not impartial or independent, were designed to shield
the accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case was not diligently prosecuted.”
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]

94

ICTR Statute, Article 8(2). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]

95

See Brown, supra note 82, at 405. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]
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alone; because there had been no previous trial in Germany, or elsewhere, there was no conflict
of non bis in idem in the ICTY’s deferral request.96 Since “[t]he notion of primacy is intended to
resolve any conflict that may arise as a result of the concurrent jurisdiction of the Rwanda
Tribunal and national courts,” it could be used to avoid situations of non bis in idem.97
Belgium has since brought the argument to the Rwanda Tribunal: since the ICTR Statute
also includes the concurrent jurisdiction provision, the Tribunal must equally respect the
concurrent exercise of jurisdiction over ICTR targets.98 This argument was flatly rejected by the
Tribunal.99 The primacy clause of the ICTR Statute requires national courts to defer jurisdiction
over ICTR targets as requested.100 This deferral can be employed to avoid non bis in idem
problems over wanted targets being tried in domestic courts.

96

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]

97

MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 22, at 313. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
17.]

98

Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga, ICTR-98-40-T, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion to Withdraw
the Indictment (18 March 1999). “Whereas, according to the Belgian Government, the
cooperation provided for by the Security Council of the United Nations in the Statute, whereby
all States must fully cooperate with the Tribunal, implies necessarily a reciprocal cooperation of
the Tribunal with States, although this is not expressly provided for in the Statute or the Rule, the
Tribunal can co-operate with States and thus facilitate the due process of Justice.” The Tribunal
went on to remind the Government of Belgium that the concurrent jurisdiction provisions of the
Statute “must be read together” with the provisions conferring primacy to the Tribunal.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]

99

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]

100

ICTR Statute, Article 8(2). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]
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iii. Conflict of Law Considerations
Since the Belgian law is merely the codification of the Geneva Conventions and its
Additional Protocols, there is no conflict of law question regarding the substance of the charges.
However, there may be problems regarding the differences in appeal procedures between the
ICTR and Belgium.
In a trial in Belgium, all pretrial hearings are secret and under the authority of the
investigative courts, while all trials are public and are under the authority of the trial courts.101
An examining magistrate first investigates serious offenses once formally requested to
investigate by the public prosecutor.102 The trial court has fact-finding jurisdiction over
misdemeanors, serious misdemeanors, and felonies.103 The “top of the judicial hierarchy” is the
Cour de Cassation, or the Supreme Court.104
At a criminal trial in Belgium, the accused is informed of the charges against him with an
introductory summons.105 The burden of proof rests with the prosecution and the trial is

101

ERNESTINE HOEGEN & MARION BRIENEN, VICTIMS OF CRIME IN 22 EUROPEAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEMS 110-111, 114-115 (2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
13.]
102

See id. at 114. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13.]

103

See id. at 115. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13.]

104

Id. at 116. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13.] See also generally the
Constitution of Belgium, for the role of the judiciary. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 3.]
105

See HOEGEN & BRIENEN, supra note 101, at 116. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 13.]
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adversarial.106 The Court plays an active part in the trial and may examine witnesses or call
experts.107 This is similar to the procedure of the ICTR.108
In the national courts of Belgium, a person may not appeal a decision on facts of a case,
only on questions of law.109 In the ICTR, appeal may be taken on the issue of error of fact or
law.110 A remedy to a charge of an unequal standard of justice may be afforded by the
Tribunal’s assumption of jurisdiction over a proceeding, since primacy may be exercised at any
point in the proceedings.111 A remedy may also be afforded to a defendant in a new trial, as
prescribed under Article 9 (1) of the ICTR Statute.112

106

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13.]

107

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13.]

108

See generally ICTR Rules of Procedure 80, 89, 90. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 1.]

109

PAUL GRAULICH ET AL., GUIDE TO FOREIGN LEGAL MATERIALS: BELGIUM-LUXEMBOURGNETHERLANDS (1968). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14.]
110

ICTR Statute, Article 24(1). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]

111

See Wedgwood, supra note 47, at 403 (discussing issues of differences in punishment and
anomalies in justice created by both concurrent jurisdiction and the right of primacy).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32.]
112

ICTR Statute, Article 9(1). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]
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C. Cases of Possible Concurrent Jurisdiction Between Belgium and ICTR and
Their Resolutions
i. The Prosecutor v. Theoneste Bagosora
On 17 May 1996, Trial Chamber I of the ICTR ruled on the Application for a Formal
Request for Deferral by the Kingdom of Belgium regarding Colonel Theoneste Bagosora.113 An
investigation and criminal proceedings had been initiated against Colonel Bagosora in Belgian
national courts regarding his “direct responsibility” for the genocide.114 The ICTR Prosecutor
had also been conducting an investigation of Colonel Bagosora for crimes under the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal.115 The Prosecutor submitted that to further investigate Colonel Bagosora’s
responsibility for serious violations of international law, access to Belgium’s evidence,
statements, documents and other findings should be transferred to the Tribunal.116
In its decision, the Trial Chamber noted that the
113

Prosecutor v. Bagosora, ICTR-96-7-D, Decision on the Application by the Prosecutor for a
Formal Request for Deferral (17 May 1996). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
5.] The Tribunal granted a request for deferral two months earlier, on 12 March 1996, in
Prosecutor v. Bagosora, ICTR-96-6-D, Decision of the Trial Chamber on the Application by the
Prosecutor for a Formal Request for Deferral to the Competence of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda in the Matter of Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines Sarl (Pursuant to
Rules 9 and 10 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence) (12 March 1996), which was complied
with by the Government of Belgium. See 2 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 1994-1999 88-91
(Andre Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 2001). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
11.]
114

2 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 1994-1999 88-91 (Andre Klip & Goran
Sluiter eds., 2001). Colonel Bagosora was being investigated for his involvement and
responsibility for the massacres following the attack on President Habyarimana, for the murder
of ten Belgian Peacekeeping soldiers, and for the effective control over the military.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]
115

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]

116

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]
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continuation of parallel investigations by the Belgian courts and the International
Tribunal might be detrimental to the investigations, including the testimonies. As
they are repeated, testimonies can indeed lose their credibility, not to mention the
risk of causing the witnesses to be distrustful; moreover the witnesses might be
traumatized and even threatened of bodily harm.117
The Trial Chamber also discussed the principle of non bis in idem, or double jeopardy, and stated
that since the ICTR Statute Article 9, paragraph 2, sets limits on those who may be retried by the
Tribunal, Colonel Bagosora would not be eligible to be retried by the Tribunal if he was first
tried in Belgium.118 This, in turn, would violate the purpose of the ICTR to investigate and
prosecute “persons in position of authority, who were responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law.”119
The Trial Chamber ruled that the request for referral should be granted and formally
requested the Kingdom of Belgium “to defer to the International Tribunal all investigations and
criminal proceedings currently being conducted against Theoneste Bagosora.”120 In the request,
the Prosecutor also noted that “the Kingdom of Belgium has always been cooperative and it is
expected that the latter would not be reluctant to accede to this request” and that the Belgian
Ministry of Justice had already indicated its willingness to comply with the request.121

117

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]

118

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]
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2 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 1994-1999 88-91 (Andre Klip & Goran
Sluiter eds., 2001). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]
120

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]

121

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11.]
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This case sets out the mechanisms by which to request a successful deferral, while noting
that prior diplomatic relations had been used to effectuate the cooperation of the deferring state
of Belgium.122
The Trial Chamber ruled on another motion by the Defence on 13 September 1999.123
The Decision on the Extremely Urgent Request Made by the Defence for Protection Measures
for Mr. Bernard Ntuyahaga addressed the issue of cooperation with the Tribunal, as at that time,
Belgium had planned on exercising jurisdiction over Ntuyahaga while his testimony might be
used in the present case against Colonel Bagosora.124 The decision stated “Article 28 obliges
States to cooperate with the Tribunal in its investigation and prosecution of accused persons, and
requires States to comply with any request for assistance or order issued by a Trial Chamber.”125

122

Prosecutor v. Bagosora, ICTR-96-7-D, Decision on the Application for a Formal Request for
Deferral (17 May 1996). “In order to meet the conditions for a deferral, the Prosecutor therefore
must demonstrate:
a) that national investigations or criminal proceedings have been instituted against said
Theoneste Bagosora by the Kingdom of Belgium respecting crimes which come under the
jurisdiction of the International Tribunal;
b) that investigations are being conducted by the Prosecutor on serious violations of
international humanitarian law allegedly committed in the territory of Rwanda or in the territory
of neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, in particular in respect
of violations allegedly committed by Theoneste Bagosora;
c) that these investigations or criminal proceedings are closely related and otherwise
involve a significant factual or legal questions which may have implications for the prosecutor’s
investigations or prosecutions.” Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5.]
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The Trial Chamber, in the case of Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, reaffirmed its primacy,
the duty of domestic courts to defer to the Tribunal, and the duty of states to cooperate with the
Tribunal.

ii. The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi
On 18 June 1997, Trial Chamber II ruled on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction in the
case of The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi.126 The Defence motion accused the Tribunal
itself of violating the principle of jus de non evocando: the right, in civil law jurisdictions, to be
tried in one’s own domestic court.127 On 11 January 1996, the Tribunal requested Belgium defer
its criminal proceedings against Kanyabashi.128 Kanyabashi had been arrested in Belgium on 28
June 1995 and was subsequently transferred to the Tribunal on 8 November 1996.129
The Tribunal soundly responded to the Defence motion regarding a lack of jurisdiction:
It is true that the Tribunal has primacy over domestic criminal Courts and may at
any stage request national Courts to defer to the competence of the Tribunal
pursuant to Article 8 of the Statute of the Tribunal, according to which the
Tribunal may request that national Courts defer to the competence of the Tribunal
at any stage of their proceedings. The Tribunal’s primacy over national Courts is
also reflected in the principle of non bis in idem as laid down in Article 9 of the
Statute and in Article 28 of the Statute which establishes that States shall comply
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without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by a Trial
Chamber.130
In the Trial Chamber’s deliberation of 23 May 2000 regarding Kanyabashi’s transfer to
the Tribunal from Belgium, it reaffirmed this stance:
The Chamber recalls that Article 8(2) of the Statute grants the Tribunal primacy
over the national courts of all States. At any stage of the procedure, the Tribunal
may formally request national courts to defer to its competence in accordance
with the Statute and the Rules.131

The Tribunal has reiterated in this series of cases its primacy over domestic courts and the
validity of that jurisdiction. Under these cases, a request for deferral to the Tribunal could not
legally be rejected by the national courts of Belgium.

iii. The Prosecutor v. Bernard Ntuyahaga
In the ICTR decision on the Prosecutor’s motion to withdraw the indictment in The
Prosecutor v. Bernard Ntuyahaga, the Government of Belgium was amicus curiae.132
Ntuyahaga was originally indicted by the ICTR for the murder of Prime Minister Agathe
Uwilingiyimana and ten Belgian Peacekeeping soldiers.133 The ICTR Prosecutor in this case was
willing to drop the indictment against Ntuyahaga on the condition that he would be released into
the custody of the Tanzanian government, an arrangement supported by Belgium, as the
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government there hoped to obtain jurisdiction over Ntuyahaga from Tanzania.134 Belgium had,
in fact, already initiated proceedings against Ntuyahaga for his involvement in the death of the
ten Belgian Peacekeepers.135 The Prosecutor argued that this withdrawal would “promote the
exercise of concurrent jurisdiction as provided for under Article 8(1) of the Statute by allowing
national courts to prosecute the accused.”136 The Government of Belgium argued that the “the
activities of the Tribunal and national jurisdictions are complementary” and “whereby all States
must fully cooperate with the Tribunal, [that] implies necessarily a reciprocal cooperation of the
Tribunal with the States.”137 The Tribunal responded to these arguments in favor of Ntuyahaga,
noting that the concurrent jurisdiction provision of the Statute must be read along with Article 8,
paragraph 2 of the Statute which gives primacy to the Tribunal over the national courts of all
states.138 This case is yet another example of the Tribunal asserting and maintaining its primacy
over national courts.

134
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D. Belgian Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction Over Rwandans Involved in the
Genocide
In the first case of its kind, four Rwandans were convicted of war crimes committed in
Rwanda in the Belgian court.139 Two Benedictine nuns (Sister Gertrude and Sister Maria Kisito),
a physics professor (Vincent Ntezimana), and a factory manager (Alphonse Higaniro) were
convicted of war crimes by twelve Belgian men and women; the first time a jury of citizens sat in
judgment over war crimes committed in another nation, whose victims were not nationals of
Belgium.140 The two nuns were found guilty of conspiring with Hutu militia as up to 7,000
Tutsis were murdered in and around the convent buildings the two nuns had forced fleeing Tutsis
away from.141 Ntezimana was found guilty of complicity of the killing of at least six Tutsi.142
Higaniro, who was a close friend of former President Habyarimana, was convicted of killing
eight people and was also accused of financing and organizing the local Hutu militia by
skimming funds off his factory which was partly state-owned.143
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The four defendants had fled to Belgium at the end of the genocide.144 While in Belgium,
the government exercised universal jurisdiction over the defendants, indicted and tried all four.145
The Belgian court was successful in its prosecution of the four defendants, yet it received both
praise and criticism for the proceedings and for its exercise of universal jurisdiction. Human
rights activists saw the case as a victory in the expansion of common principles of international
law.146 Belgium’s history as a former colonial ruler in Rwanda, however, offended some Hutus
who questioned the lack of investigations into European governments regarding their knowledge
of the genocide in Rwanda, and possible failure to act.147 One reporter described the trial as “not
an allegory of innocence, after all, but a study in the unimaginable disguises of evil.”148
The significance of this trial is twofold: 1) the targets were not high level authorities,
better suited for prosecution at the Tribunal, yet were involved in the atrocities that still impacted
the genocide; and 2) the success of the trial in the national court of Belgium may serve to
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encourage other national courts to prosecute the same types of perpetrators,149 thus lessening the
burden on the ICTR so it may focus on high level authorities.
The sheer number of persons arrested for their involvement in the Rwandan genocide
makes it impractical for the ICTR to prosecute all those indicted.”150 Even the most “welldesigned international criminal tribunal has sharp limitations, especially in handling a high
volume of criminal prosecutions.151 This is one of the reasons why the concurrent jurisdiction
provisions were included in the ICTR Statute.152 The national courts can work in conjunction
with the Tribunal “to ensure that the greatest number of the so-called genocidaires are brought to
justice.”153 Belgium’s codification of the Geneva convention serves to guarantee that
perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity do not go unpunished.154
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The symbolic effect of prosecuting leaders and figure-heads in the Tribunal gives respect
and validity to the Tribunal, while working toward national reconciliation.155 Transplanting the
very system which is to foster this reconciliation, especially 3000 miles away to Belgium, may
serve to weaken the authority of the Tribunal, and possibly the United Nation as its forming
body. The national courts, including Belgium’s, can serve as a supplemental arena for the
execution of justice. However, the Tribunal is a more appropriate place for the prosecution of
the main instigators and sources of the genocide in Rwanda: the leaders and figure-heads.
It has been said that “the ultimate success or failure of the Rwanda Tribunal depends on
the financial and political support of the international community, which, in turn, depends on a
firm resolve to vindicate the most elementary norms of humanity.”156 Belgium has the
opportunity to support the international community with its exercise of universal jurisdiction, but
must be careful not to undermine the success of the Tribunal by prosecuting main targets of the
ICTR, like leaders and figure-heads.157 A consistent exercise of primacy by the ICTR over key
targets being investigated or prosecuted in national courts can serve to strengthen the ICTR
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itself. Allowing national courts to investigate and prosecute individuals who were not leaders or
figure-heads in the genocide, yet should nonetheless be prosecuted, can only help to bring the
most numbers of genocidaires to justice.
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